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1 Glossary
Cumulated payoff
It refers to the reward accumulation or the score counting for all the in-
dividual strategies being held by the agents in the game. Each strategy has
its own value of cumulated payoff. When a strategy gives a winning or losing
prediction for the next round of the game (no matter whether the agents follow
this prediction), scores are added to or deducted from this strategy respectively.
It is also known as virtual point or virtual score of the strategies. The way of
rewarding or penalizing is known as the payoff function.
Attendance
In the contexts of the Minority Game, attendance refers to the collective
sum of all agents’ actions at each round of the game. For the ordinary games, it
is equal to the difference in the number of agents in choosing the two different
choices or actions (in early formulation, it is equal to the number of agents in
choosing one of the particular choice). The terminology “attendance” origins
from the ancestor form of the Minority Game, the ElFarol Bar problem by W.
B. Arthur, in which agents choose whether to attend a bar at every round of
the game.
Volatility
Volatility in Minority Games is the time average variance of the attendance
after each round of the game. It is an inverse measure of the efficiency of resource
distribution in the game. A high volatility corresponds to large fluctuations
in attendance and hence an inefficient game. A low volatility corresponds to
smaller fluctuations in attendance and hence an efficient game.
Predictability
It is an important macroscopic measurable in the game and also the order
parameter which characterizes the major phase transition in the system. It is
usually denoted by H which is a measure of non-uniform probabilistic outcome
of the attendance given a certain information provided to the agents. A higher
predictability refers to the case where attendance tends to be positive or neg-
ative for a certain piece of information, which makes the game outcome more
predictable.
Symmetric and asymmetric phase
The two important phases of the system. The symmetric phase is also
known as crowded phase or the unpredictable phase. The asymmetric phase
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is also known as uncrowded phase, the dilute phase or the predictable phase.
The system’s behaviours, dynamics and characteristics are different in this two
phases. The two phases are characterized by the order parameter, called the
predictability H .
Endogenous and exogenous games
Endogenous games refer to games which utilize the past winning history to
generate signals or informations for agents to make decisions in the next round.
Endogenous games are also known as games with real history. Exogenous games
refer to games which utilize random signals or informations for agents to make
decisions in the next round. Exogenous games are also known as games with
random history, or external information.
On-line Update and Batch Update
On-line update refers to the evaluation of payoffs of strategies after each
round of the game. Thus, the priority of strategies being employed by an agent
may be altered after any round of the game. Exogenous game or random history
game sometimes employ the batch update method which refers to the evaluation
of payoffs on strategies only after a fixed number of rounds where all the possible
signals or informations have been appeared. In games with ordinary batch
update, all the possible signals appear once in each batch before the update of
payoffs on strategies, the order of appearance of signals in each batch is thus
irrelevant.
2 Definition of the Subject and Its Importance
The Minority Game (abbreviated, MG) refers to the simple adaptive multi-
agent model of financial markets with the original formulation introduced by
Challet and Zhang in 1997. In this model of repeated games, agents choose
between one of the two decisions at each round of the game, using their own
simple inductive strategies. At each round, the minority group of agents win the
game and rewards are given to those strategies that predict the winning side.
Daily examples of minority game include drivers choosing a less crowded road
or people choosing a less crowded restaurant. Unlike most economics models or
theories that assume investors are deductive in nature, a trial-and-error induc-
tive thinking approach is implicitly implemented in process of decision making
when agents choose their choices in the games. In this original formulation,
the history or the information given to agents is a string of binary bit which is
composed of the winning sides in the past few rounds.
While the original model is simple, many variants of the models came out
after the original model. In some other context and later literatures, the term
“Minority Games” is sometimes referred to as a class of multi-agent models
which contains all the variants of the original Minority Game. Most of the
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models in this class of game share the principal features that agents are inductive
in nature. Thus, strategies with accumulated virtual score are usually present
in this set of models. As a result, the original formulation of the Minority Game
by Challet and Zhang in 1997 is sometimes referred as the “original Minority
Game” or the “basic Minority Game”.
With attempts of investigating economical dynamics, physicists found most
of the economics models deductive in nature. Since investors have expectation
of the future, economical models conceptually differ from conventional physical
models in which variables are only history dependence. As a result, it becomes
difficult for physicists to develop and analyze the traditional financial models,
even with well-developed mathematical tools. The El Farol bar problem and
the Minority Game somehow tackle the problem by assuming investors can be
inductive in nature with bounded rationality, which they predict the future by
only examining the past states of the system, similar to the ordinary physics
models.
In the physics community, the basic Minority Game and its variants are an
interesting and newly established class of complex and disordered systems which
contain a large amount of physical aspects. In addition to the modeling purpose
of the financial markets, it is also a simple model where Hamiltonian can be
defined and analytic solutions are developed in some regime of the model, from
which the model is viewed with a complete physical sense. It is also characterized
by a clear two-phase structure with very different collective behaviours in the
two phases, as in conventional physical systems. All these physical properties
further raise the interests of physicists in understanding and solving the model
analytically, using the techniques origin from statistical mechanics. Other than
these collective behaviours, physicists are also interested in the dynamics of the
games. Periodic attractors, anti-persistence and crowd-anticrowd movement
of agents are also observed. In this way, the Minority Game and its variants
serve as a useful tool and provide a new direction for physicists in viewing and
analyzing the underlying dynamics in the financial markets, and at the same
time analytical techniques from statistical physics can be widely applicable.
On the other hand, for modeling purposes, Minority Games serve as a class
of simple models which are able to produce some of macroscopic features being
observed in the real financial markets. Such features are usually termed as
stylized facts which include the fat-tail price return distribution and volatility
clustering. Crashes and bubbles are also observed in some of the variants and
other models inspired by the Minority Game. The grand-canonical versions of
the game suggest the conjecture of financial markets being a critical phenomenon
in physics.
Due to the simplicity of the original model, a large freedom is found in
modifying the models to make the models more realistic and closer to the real
financial markets. Many details in the model can be fine-tuned to imitate the
real markets. Minority Games setup a framework of agent-based models where
predictability of financial data may be possible. Sophisticated models based on
games can be setup and implemented on real trading, which show a great poten-
tial over the commonly adopted statistical techniques in financial analysis, As a
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result, Minority Games raise the interests of some of the economists in switch-
ing to employ agent-based models in understanding the underlying mechanism
behind the socio-economics systems. Minority Games also shift the emphasis
of some economists in investigating the formation of price pattern, rather than
just data analysis of the price pattern.
3 Introduction
The basic Minority Game is formulated by Damien Challet and Yi-Cheng Zhang
in 1997 [1] with their work being published in a statistical physics journal.
This model is inspired by the El Farol Bar problem introduced by W. Brian
Arthur in 1994 [2] with his work being presented and published in an economical
meeting and its proceedings. This already shows the interdisciplinary nature of
the Minority Game with an economical origin, in a physical perspective. The
Minority Game follows the major conceptual structure being implemented in
the El Farol Bar problem, with some modifications on the model structure.
In the original El Farol Bar problem, each individual of a population choose
whether to attend a bar on every thursday evening. The bar has limited number
of seats and can at most entertain x% of the population. If less than x% of the
population go to the bar, the show in the bar is considered to be enjoyable
and it is better to attend the bar rather than staying at home. On the other
hand, if more than x% of the population go to the bar, all the people in the bar
would have an unenjoyable show and staying at home is considered to be better
choice than attending the bar. In order to make decisions on whether to attend
the bar, all the individuals are equipped with certain number of strategies.
These strategies provide them the predictions of the attendance in the bar next
week, based on the attendance in the past few weeks. All individuals rank their
strategies according to their past performance and make decisions by considering
the attendance predicted by their own best strategy.
Several changes are made in the model when the Minority Game is for-
mulated from the El Farol Bar problem. Instead of using the history of past
attendance, a string of binary bits which records the past few winning predic-
tions or actions are employed as information. The predictions of the strategies
are the winning choices in the next round, with no prediction about the actual
size of attendance. Thus, binary information and predictions are implemented,
which greatly reduce the dimensional space of the system. In addition, the
winning choice is determined by the minority choice (instead of the parameter
x in the Bar problem) at every round of the game, hence the two choices are
symmetric. Due to the minority rule, the population is restricted to be an odd
integer in the original formulation.
These modifications of binary and symmetric actions make the model more
accessible for the physics community. The first publication of the Minority Game
raised a great interest for some of the statistical physicists to carry on researching
the Minority Game and formulate its variants. Some of the physicists begin to
identify the study of such class of models as in the field of econophysics. In
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1999, R. Savit et al. [3] published their work on the analysis of the Minority
Game, which is crucial to subsequent theoretical developments of the game.
They discovered an important control parameter α, which is defined as the
ratio of total amount of possible information to the population size. It rescales
the macroscopic observables of the game for different amount of information
and population size. A phase transition is observed at the critical value of α
which separate the two phases, namely the symmetric phase and the asymmetric
phase.
After their discovery on the rescaling properties and the phase transition of
the Minority Game, great efforts were put to solve the model analytically, using
well-developed techniques in the field of statistical physics [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. In order to solve the model, the basic Minority Game
is sometimes modified to increase the feasibility of analytical approach. In some
variants of the Minority Game, the model is simplified to preserve only the
major dynamical behaviours while in some other variants, features are added
to the game which make the model more comparable to traditional physical
models. As a result, a large number of variants of the Minority Game come out
with the attempt of analytic description.
On the other hand, attempts are also made to make the models more
comparable to real financial markets. Some physicists and even economists
modify the basic model by putting in more features from the real markets
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. Stylized facts are found in the critical
regime of the grand-canonical version [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28] of the Minority
Game in which agents can choose to refrain from participation in the game.
This suggests the conjecture of financial markets being in critical state and
further push the development of the model towards this direction. Some new
models are also developed to include more financial aspects. Efforts are made to
have a better understanding of the market through the agent-based approach.
The macroscopic observations from the models become more realistic but at the
same time, the models become more sophisticated. Due to the analytic goal in
solving the model in a physical sense and for the modeling purposes, there are
vast number of variants of the Minority Game which make it a class of models.
In the following sections, we briefly describe the formulation of the basic
model and its variants, and briefly introduce the physical properties, the ana-
lytic approaches of the model and its link with financial markets. We review
the formulation of the basic Minority Game in Section 4. Some major physi-
cal properties of the basic Minority Game are given in Section 5, the effect of
temperature is also discussed which was originally introduced in the Thermal
Minority Game (TMG). In Section 6, we review briefly some important vari-
ants of the Minority Game and their physical significance, these include the
Evolutionary Minority Game (EMG), the TMG, the Minority Game without
information and the Grand-canonical Minority Game (GCMG) while their cor-
responding implications for the financial markets and some other variants will
be discussed in Section 8. In Section 7, we briefly introduce some of the analytic
approaches on the Minority Game. In Section 8, we review some of the financial
features produced by Minority Games and their implications. Finally in Section
6
History Prediction
000 1
001 0
010 0
100 1
011 0
101 1
110 0
111 0
Table 1: An example of strategy with M = 3
9, we describe some of the possible directions for the future development of the
Minority Game.
4 The Minority Game
The basic Minority Game [1] is defined as follows. We consider a population
of N agents competing in repeated games, where N is an odd integer. At each
round of the game, each agent has to choose between one of the two actions,
namely “0” and “1” (in most of the subsequent literatures, “-1” and “1” instead
of “0” and “1” are used as the actions, we shall keep the following discussions
using the actions “-1” and “1”), which can also be interpreted as the“sell” and
“buy” actions. These actions are sometimes called the bid and is denoted by
ai(t), corresponding to the bid of agent i at time t. The minority choices win
the game at that round and all the winning agents are rewarded.
Before the game starts, every agent draws S strategies from a strategy pool
which help them to make decisions throughout the game. There is no a priori
best strategy. These strategies can be visualized in the form of tables where each
strategy contains a “history column” (or “signal” column) and a “prediction
column”. Each row of the history column is a string ofM bits, which represents
the history of the past winning actions in the previous M steps, which is also
known as signal or information. The history is evolving with time and is usually
denoted by µ(t). The parameterM is sometimes known as the brain size or the
memory of the agents. An example of strategy with M = 3 is given in Table 1.
For games with memory M , the total number of possible signals is 2M and thus
the total number of possible strategies in the strategy pool is 22
M
. We note
that even a relatively small M , such as M = 5, the total number of possible
strategies is already huge.
As shown in the strategy in Table 1, a history of “110” corresponds to the
case where the past 3 winning actions are “1”, “1” and “0”, and the corre-
sponding prediction of winning choice for the next round is “0”. Strategies can
be conveniently represented by P -dimensional vectors which record only the P
predictions, where P = 2M . If the strategy gives a correct prediction on the
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winning choice, one point is awarded to the strategy. All the S strategies of
an agent have to predict at every round of the game, and points are given to
those strategies (no matter whether they are being selected by the agent to
make real actions) that give correct predictions. The scores of all the strategies
are accumulated which are thus known as the virtual points, virtual scores or
the cumulated payoffs of the strategies. These scores start at zero in the basic
Minority Game. At every round of the game, agents make their decisions ac-
cording to the strategy with the highest virtual score at that particular moment.
If there are more than one strategies with the highest score, one of these strate-
gies is randomly employed. Agents themselves who make the winning decisions
are also rewarded with points, and is called the real points of the agents (to be
distinguished from the virtual points of the strategies).
More explicitly, we define the attendance A(t) as the collective sum of actions
from all agents at time t. If we denote the prediction of strategy s of agent i
under the information µ(t) to be a
µ(t)
i,s at time t, which can be either “-1” or “1”
, each strategy can be represented by a P -dimensional vector ~ai,s where all the
entries are either “-1” or “1”. The attendance A(t) can then be expressed as
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i,si(t)
=
N∑
i=1
ai(t) (1)
where si(t) denotes the best strategy of agent i at time t, i.e .
si(t) = argmax
s
Ui,s(t) (2)
and ai(t) denotes the the real actions or so-called the bids of the agents, i.e.
ai(t) = a
µ(t)
i,si(t)
(3)
With this A(t), the cumulative virtual score or payoff Ui,s of the strategy s of
agent i can be updated by
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)− sign[aµ(t)i,s A(t)] (4)
where sign(x) is the sign function (in some literatures where “0” and “1” are
employed as actions, the last term in Eq. (4) becomes −sign[(2aµ(t)i,s − 1)A(t)])
Here one point is added or deducted from the strategies which give a correct or
wrong prediction respectively, and is usually called the step payoff scheme. We
note that the negative sign in Eq. (4) corresponds to the minority nature of the
game, i.e. when a
µ(t)
i,s and A(t) are of opposite signs, a point is added to the
strategy. The real gain of agent i at time t is −sign[ai(t)A(t)].
Thus, every agent is considered to be adaptive, who can choose between
their s strategies and the relative preference of using strategies is changing with
time and adaptive to the market outcomes. They are also considered to be
inductive, who base their decisions according to the best choice they know,
with their limited number of strategies, but not the global best choice given
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by all possible strategies (the one with highest virtual score among the entire
strategy space). The game is also a self-contained model, in which the agents
make individual actions according to the history, individual actions are summed
up to give the history for the next round which is then used by the agents to
make predictions again.
As the total number of agents N in the game is an odd integer, the minority
side can always be determined and the number of winners is always less than
the number of losers, implying the Minority Game to be a negative sum game.
Due to the minority nature of the game and as the two actions are symmetric,
the time average of A(t) always has a value of 0 (or 〈A(t)〉 = N/2 if “0” and “1”
are employed as actions). Hence, instead of the average attendance, one may
be more interested in the fluctuations of attendance around the average values
and this turns out to be the one of the most important macroscopic observables
in the subsequent development. We denote σ2 to be the variance of attendance,
or also known as the volatility, given by
σ2 = 〈A2〉 − 〈A〉2 (5)
with 〈A〉 = 0 for games with actions “-1” and “1”. σ2 is an inverse measure
of the market efficiency in the game. We consider two extreme cases of game
outcomes. For the first one, there is only one agent choosing one side while all
the others choose the opposite side. There is a single winner and N − 1 losers
which is considered to be highly inefficient in the sense of resource allocation, and
the supply and demand are highly unbalanced. For the second case, (N − 1)/2
of the agents choose one side while (N +1)/2 of the agents choose the opposite
side. There are (N − 1)/2 winners and the supply and demand is maximally
balanced. Thus, one may expect to minimize fluctuations of attendance for
advantages of agents as a whole.
Some simplifications or modifications to the basic Minority Game are sug-
gested and employed in later literatures, where the major physical features of
the models are preserved. A. Cavagna [29, 30] observed that the variance of
attendance is almost unaffected if the history string is replaced by a random
invented string, provided that all agents receive the same string at the same
time. That is, instead of their self-generated winning history, they react to
a virtual random information which is completely unrelated to the previous
winning groups. In this case, the signal strings are usually called information
instead of history. The games which feedback the real history are known as the
endogenous games while those games which employ random history is called the
exogenous games. In exogenous games, the total number of signal is no longer
restricted to be 2M , instead it can be any integer which is usually denoted by P ,
and is sometimes known as the complexity of information. Every random signal
or information appears with a probability of 1/P . These random informations
make the dynamics of the game more stochastic, which is an extreme advantage
for analytic approaches. In endogenous game, P = 2M .
As “-1” and “1” are employed as actions, instead of adding or deducting one
virtual point to the strategies, the cumulated payoff Ui,s can be updated by the
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following equation with linear payoff scheme
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)− aµ(t)i,s A(t) (6)
where A(t) is the attendance given by Eq. (1). A factor of 1/N , 1/
√
N or 1/P
are always employed to rescale the last term. While the real gain for agent
i is −ai(t)A(t), the total gain for all the agents is
∑
i−ai(t)A(t) = −A2(t),
preserving the negative sum nature of the game. This modification is important
for analysis while the qualitative behaviours of the game are preserved. It also
has the meaning of having a higher reward or larger penalty if a smaller minority
or a larger majority group is predicted respectively.
In the original game, the ordinary strategy space has a size of 22
M
. Challet et
al. [38] showed that a reduced strategy space (RSS) can be employed in which the
qualitative behaviours of the game and the numerical values of variance are not
largely affected. We first construct a set of 2M uncorrelated strategies, in which
every two strategies of the set have exactly half of the predictions different. The
reduced strategy space is then formed by combining this set with the set of
their anti-correlated strategies, in which every strategies in the latter set have
exactly opposite predictions to their anti-partners in the former set. Hence, the
size of the reduced strategy space is 2M · 2 = 2M+1. This virtue of the reduced
strategy space simplify the theoretical analysis in crowd-anticrowd approaches
[4, 6, 5]. Although the dimension of reduced strategy space is highly reduced,
the ordinary strategy space is commonly employed in numerical simulations.
5 The Physical Properties of the Minority Game
There are several parameters being introduced in the basic Minority Game,
include N ,M (or P ) and S corresponding to the population size, the memory of
the agents (the complexity or the total amount of possible information) and the
number of strategies that each agent holds. The predictions aµi,s of strategies are
fixed for every agents throughout the game and are considered to be quenched
disorders of the system in physics. The cumulated payoffs of strategies which
evolve with time are considered to be dynamic variables or annealed variables
of the system. The game is also a highly frustrated model. Due to the minority
nature of the model, frustration results in the fact that not all the agents can be
satisfied simultaneously. We focus our discussions on the case of S = 2, where
cases of larger S (not extensively large) will be briefly discussed and have been
shown in to share very similar behaviours as the case of S = 2[38].
5.1 Major features: Phase transition, Volatility and Pre-
dictability
In 1999, Robert Savit, Radu Manuca and Rick Riolo [3] found that the macro-
scopic behaviour of the system does not depend independently on the parameters
10
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Figure 1: The simulation results of the volatility σ2/N as a function of the
control parameter α = 2M/N for games with S = 2 strategies for each agent av-
eraged over 100 samples. Endogenous information and linear payoff are adopted
in these simulations. Dotted line shows the value of volatility in random choice
limit. Solid line shows the critical value of α = αc ≈ 0.3374. Resolution of the
curve can be improved to shows σ2/N attains minimum at α ≈ αc
N and M , but instead depends on the ratio
α ≡ 2
M
N
=
P
N
(7)
(which is denoted by z in their original paper) which serves as the most impor-
tant control parameter in the game. This scaling is also true for P 6= 2M in
exogenous games. The volatility σ2/N and the predictability H/N (which we
are going to define later) for different values of N and M depend only on the
ratio α. A plot of σ2/N against the control parameter α for endogenous game
is shown in Fig. 1. We can see that the graph shows a data collapse of σ2/N
for different values of N and M . The dotted line in Fig. 1 corresponds to the
coin-toss limit (random choice limit), in which agents play by making random
decisions at every rounds of the game. This value of volatility in coin-toss limit
can be obtained by simply assuming a binomial distribution of agents’ actions,
with probability 0.5, where σ2/N = 0.5(1 − 0.5) · 4 = 1. When α is small,
the volatility of the game is larger than the coin-toss limit which implies the
collective behaviours of agents are worse than the random choices. In early
literatures, it is known as the worse-than-random regime. When α increases,
the volatility decreases and enter a region where agents are performing better
than the random choices, which is known as the better-than-random regime.
The volatility reaching a minimum value which is substantially smaller than
the coin-toss limit. When α further increases, the volatility increases again and
approaches the coin-toss limit.
These results also allow us to identify two phases in the Minority Game, as
separated by the minimum of volatility in the graph. The value of α where the
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rescaled volatility attends its minimum is denoted by αc, which represents the
phase transition point. αc has a value of 0.3374 . . . (for S = 2) by analytical
calculations [8, 14]. Generally, for α < αc, the volatility σ
2 and the spread of
volatility for different samples of simulation are proportional to N2. Beyond
the transition point for α > αc, the volatility σ
2 and the spread of volatility
are generally proportional to N . These can be recognized by the asymptotic
behaviour of the graph in Fig 1 where the slope approaches −1 for α < αc and
approaches 0 for α > αc.
In addition to the different scaling of volatility with N , other quantities also
show different behaviours in the two phases. By examining the distributions
of winning probabilities for a particular action after different history strings,
R. Savit et al. [3] found that these distributions are completely different in
the two phases. By defining P(1|µ), to be the conditional probability of action
“1” turns out to be the minority group after the history or information µ, the
histogram for P(1|µ) is flat at 0.5 for all µ when α < αc, as shown in Fig. 2(a).
For α > αc as shown in Fig. 2(b), this histogram for P(1|µ) is not flat and
uniform. This result is highly important which implies that below αc, there is
no extractable information from the history string of length M , since the two
actions have equal probability of winning (both are 0.5) for any history string.
However, beyond the phase transition when α > αc, there is an unequal winning
probability of the two actions, by just looking at the past M winning actions
of the game. Hence, we can call the phase for α < αc the unpredictable or the
symmetric phase, as agents cannot predict the winning actions from the past
M -bit history (the winning probabilities are symmetric). On the contrary, the
phase of α > αc is called the predictable or the asymmetric phase, as there is bias
of winning actions given the pastM -bit history string (the winning probabilities
are asymmetric).
Owing to the results in these histograms, a useful quantity can be defined
to measure the “non-uniformity” of the winning probabilities or the informa-
tion content given by the past M -bit history string. We denote H to be the
predictability of the game which is given by the following formula,
H =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2 (8)
with P = 2M again. H/N is plotted as a function of α in Fig. 3. In the
symmetric phase, 〈A|µ〉 = 0 for all µ as the actions of “-1” and “1” are equally
likely to appear after µ. Hence, H = 0 in the symmetric phase. In the asym-
metric phase, 〈A|µ〉 6= 0 for all µ as the actions of “-1” and “1” are not equally
likely after µ. Hence, H > 0 in the asymmetric phase. H begins to increase
at α = αc as shown in Fig. 3. Analytic approaches are developed which are
based the minimization of predictability H [7, 8, 9, 10] In addition to the pre-
dictability H , the fraction of frozen agents also increases drastically before αc
and decreases afterward. Frozen agents are agents who always use the same
strategy for making decisions. In contrast, fickle agents are those who always
switch strategies.
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Figure 2: The histogram of the probabilities P(1|µ) of winning action to be “1”
given information µ (plotted as the decimal representations of the binary strings
of information), for games of N = 101 agents and S = 2 in (a) symmetric phase
with M = 5, i.e. α ≈ 0.316 < αc and (b) asymmetric phase with M = 6, i.e.
α ≈ 0.634 > αc. Endogenous information and linear payoff are adopted. The
histogram in (a) would be even more uniform if step payoff is adopted, as shown
in the original paper [3].
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Figure 3: The simulation results of the predictability H as a function of the
control parameter α = 2M/N for games with S = 2 strategies for each agent av-
eraged over 100 samples. Endogenous information and linear payoff are adopted
in these simulations.
In exogenous games, the phase transition, the scaling by α and the prop-
erties of the two phases preserve. The symmetric and asymmetric winning
probabilities also preserve with µ representing the random information given to
the agents in the conditional probabilities P(1|µ) (not the actual past history)
[30, 31]. The numerical values of volatility in the asymmetric phase has a small
deviation from that of the endogenous games. It is because the winning proba-
bilities are asymmetric, the probability of history appearance is non-uniform in
endogenous games, while in exogenous games, we assume a uniform appearing
probability of all the random information µ being given to the agents.
5.2 Formation of Crowds and Anitcrowds and Anti-persistence
in the Symmetric Phase
In the symmetric phase with small α, the amount of available information P is
small when compared to the number of agents N . Agents are able to exploit
the information well and they react like a crowd which result in a large volatil-
ity. From the point of view of the strategy space, the number of independent
strategies [38, 4, 6, 5] (as discussed in RSS) is smaller than N in the symmetric
phase. Many agents use identical strategies and react in the same or similar
ways, forming crowds and anticrowds giving large volatility. This is sometimes
known as the herd effect in the minority game. On the other hand, in the asym-
metric phase with large α, the available information P is too much and complex
when compared to N . Agents are not able to exploit all the information and
they react like making random decisions, resulting in a volatility approaching
the coin-toss limit. In this case, the number of independent strategies is greater
than N and agents are unlikely to use the same strategies, they acts indepen-
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dently and crowds are not formed. The phase transition occurs when αc is
roughly O(1), where N is roughly the same size as the available information P .
In addition to formation of crowds, anti-persistence of the winning actions
exists in the symmetric phase. For small α in the symmetric phase, consecutive
occurrence of the same signal lead to opposite winning actions [3, 11, 32], which
is known as anti-persistence of the Minority Game. For example, in the case
of M = 2, if the history “01” leads to a winning choice of “0”, then the next
appearance of the history “01” will lead to a winning choice of “1”. It results
in a periodic dynamics of the game for α < αc with a period of 2
M · 2, where
every history appear exactly twice with different winning actions for the first
and second occurrence. This kind of anti-persistence disappears in the asym-
metric phase. Instead, persistence is more likely [11], in which the consecutive
occurrence of the same signal tends to have a higher probability in giving out
the same winning actions.
5.3 Dependence on Temperature and Initial Conditions
In 1999, Cavagna et al. [35] introduced the probabilistic fashion, the tempera-
ture, to the decision making process of agents in the model known as Thermal
Minority Game (TMG). This stochasticity of temperature can also be imple-
mented in the basic game. Instead of choosing the best strategy for sure, agents
employ their strategy s with the probabilities πi,s given by
Prob{si(t) = s} = πi,s = e
ΓUi,s(t)
∑
s′ e
ΓUi,s′(t)
(9)
where si(t) denote the strategy being employed by agent i at time t. Γ is denoted
by β in the original formulation, which corresponds to the inverse temperature
(as in physical systems) of individual agents. It can also be interpreted as the
learning rate of the system [10]. Roughly speaking, this is because the dynamics
of scores take a time of approximately 1/Γ to learn a difference in the cumulated
payoffs of the strategies. For small Γ, the system take a convergence time of
order N/Γ to reach the steady state [36, 37], which also reveals the physical
meaning of Γ as learning rate.
In the asymmetric phase, the final state of the system and hence the volatility
are independent of Γ [10]. In the symmetric phase, the final state of the system
is dependent on Γ and the volatility of the system increases with increasing Γ,
provided that the system has reached the steady state [37]. This property of the
game is in contrast to the ordinary physical systems, where fluctuations increase
with increasing temperature. In the Minority Game, fluctuations increase with
increasing Γ, i.e. decreasing temperature, as Γ is implemented as individual
inverse temperature in choosing strategies. As a result, in addition to inverse
temperature or learning rate, Γ can also be interpreted as collective or global
effective temperature of the whole system, since global fluctuations increase with
Γ. In contrast to σ2, predictability H is independent of Γ in both symmetric
and asymmetric phases [10].
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Figure 4: The simulation results of the volatility as a function of the control
parameter α = 2M/N for games with S = 2, 3, 4 strategies for each agent aver-
aged over 100 samples. Endogenous information and linear payoff are adopted
in these simulations. Volatility generally increases with the number of strategies
S per agent. Data collapse of volatility is shown for different values of S.
In addition to dependence on Γ in the symmetric phase, the final state of
the system is dependence on the initial conditions. For games with the same set
of strategies among agents (identical quenched disorders), the final state of the
system is dependent on the bias of initial virtual scores (heterogeneous initial
conditions of annealed variables) of the strategies [10, 32]. For the case of S = 2,
the volatility of the system is smaller if larger differences are assigned to the
initial virtual scores (i.e. initial bias) of the two strategies, given the same Γ is
implemented [9]. A system with final condition depending on the initial state of
annealed variable corresponds to the spin glass phase, or the replica symmetry
breaking (RSB) phenomenon in physical systems. Thus, the symmetric phase
also corresponds to the behaviours of broken replica symmetry. On the other
hand, in the asymmetric phase, the final state of the system and hence the values
of volatility is independent of the initial conditions. Thus, the asymmetric phase
also corresponds to the replica symmetry (RS) phase in physical systems.
5.4 The cases of S > 2
Finally, the behaviours of the game are also dependent on S, the number of
strategies that each agent hold. As shown in Fig. (4) where the volatility is
plotted against α = 2M/N , the volatility of the system is dependent on S.
Data collapse of volatility with different values of N and M is still shown by
plotting volatility against α, for each value of S. While the generic shape of
the curves preserve when S increases, the points of minimum volatility shift to
the right which suggests that the phase transition point is a function of S. It is
also suggested in [38, 42] that for the cases of S > 2, instead of α = 2M/N , the
important control parameter should be 2M+1/SN . Since 2M+1 is the number of
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important strategies in the reduced strategy space and SN is the total number of
strategies held by all agents, when 2M+1 < SN , some agents are using identical
strategies and crowds and anticrowds are formed. On the other hand, when
2M+1 > SN , most agents are using independent strategies and crowds are not
formed. Numerical solutions from replica approach for different values of S show
the relation of αc(S) ≈ αc(S = 2) + (S − 2)/2 to a high degree of accuracy [9].
6 Variants of the Minority Game
After the first publication of the Arthur’s bar problem and the Minority Game,
many variants of the game are established and studied by the physics commu-
nity and also some economists. Some of this variant models are developed to
further simplify the Minority Game or to include more features from the fi-
nancial markets. Most of the modifications include the use of different kind of
strategies and payoff functions, the presence of different kinds of agents and the
increased flexibility in participation of agents, evolution of agents, replacement
of poorly-performed agents by new agents and the individual concerns for cap-
ital. In this section, some of these variants are briefly introduced together with
their physical significance to the development of the Minority Game. We leave
their implications to the financial markets to Section 8.
6.1 The Evolutionary Minority Game or the Genetic Model
In 1999, N. F. Johnson et al. [20] introduced the Evolutionary Minority Game
which is usually quoted as EMG in literatures or the Genetic Model in later
literatures. From the name of EMG, evolution of agents is an important feature
added to the game. In addition, the strategies employed by agents are also
major modifications. Unlike the basic Minority Game, all agents in EMG hold
only one strategy S = 1 and the strategy table is identical for everyone. For
example in the case of M = 3, all agents hold one strategy as in Table 1.
Instead of having a column of fixed predictions, this column record the most
recent past winning action or choice for the corresponding history. Thus, this
strategy table is time dependent. To make decisions, all agents are assigned
a different probability pi at the beginning, with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, which is defined
as the probability that agent i acts according to the strategy table, i.e. follow
the recent winning action or the last outcome for that M -bit history. With a
probability 1− pi, agent i choose the choice opposite to the past winning action
for that history. This probability pi (rather than the strategy table) acts as a
role of strategy in making decisions for agents and is called “strategy” in EMG
or the “gene” value in Genetic Model. Hence, the payoff or scores are rewarded
or penalized subject to pi.
To enhance the evolutionary property of the game, agents are allowed to
modify the pi if the scores fall below a threshold denoted by d, where d < 0,
which is sometimes known as the death score. The new pi is being drawn with an
equal probability in the range (pi−r/2, pi+r/2) of width r, with either periodic
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Figure 5: The simulation results of the distribution P(pi) in a game of N =
10001 agents with d = −4 andM = 3. The distribution is obtained after 120000
time steps and averaged over 50 simulations. Self-segregation and clustering of
agents at different values of R are shown.
or reflective boundary condition at pi = 0 or pi = 1. This corresponds to an
evolution of strategy (the probability pi), or the mutation of the gene value pi
with mutation range r, as a result the EMG is also known as the Genetic Model.
It is found that in the ordinary EMG with winning rule to be the minority group
(A(t) < N/2), the memory M of the strategy table is not relevant in affecting
the major features (include the steady state distribution P(pi)) of the system
[39], but may be relevant with other winning rules (winning level other than
N/2) [33]. Thus, the volatility is independent of M in the ordinary EMG, in
contrast to the basic Minority Game.
In this ordinary model, one point is added to or deducted from the strategy
pi for winning or losing predictions. The possibilities of having a non-unity
price-to-fine ratio R are introduced in Hod et al. [40, 39]. For R > 1, agents
are in a wealthy regime since the gain is larger than the lose in one game. For
R < 1, agents are in a tough regime. The system behaviours are dependent
on R, with two thresholds R
(1)
c and R
(2)
c , both R
(1)
c and R
(2)
c are less than and
close to 1, with R
(1)
c > R
(2)
c . In the regime where R > R
(1)
c , after a sufficient
long time of evolution, the agents self-segregated into two opposing group at
pi = 0, 1 and a ”U-shaped” P (p) distribution is found as shown in the case of
R = 1 in Fig. 5. It implies agents tend to behave in an extreme way in a rich
economy. In the regime where R < R
(2)
c , the agents cluster at pi = 0.5 and an
”inverse-U-shaped” distribution is found as shown in the case of R = 0.97 in
Fig. 5, implying agents tend to be more cautious in a poor economy.
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6.2 The Thermal Minority Game
In addition to the stochasticity in choosing strategies as introduced by Eq.(9)
discussed in the Section 5, there are several other modifications from the basic
Minority Game in the TMG [35]. In the original formulation, the strategy is a
vector in the P -dimensional real space RP denoted by ~ai,s, with ||~ai,s|| =
√
P .
Thus, the strategy space is the surface of the P -dimensional hypersphere and
the components of the strategies are continuous. It is different from the discrete
strategies in the basic Minority Game. Every agent in the game draw S vector
strategies before the game starts.
The information processed by the strategies is a random vector ~η(t), with a
unit-length in RP . The response or the bid of the strategy is no longer integer
and is given by the inner product of the strategies and the information, i.e.
~ai,s · ~η(t). Hence, the attendance A(t) is given by
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
~ai,si(t) · ~η(t) (10)
with si(t) denotes the chosen strategy of agent i at time t. The cumulated payoff
of strategy can be updated by
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)−A(t)[~ai,s · ~η(t)]. (11)
TMG can be considered as a continuous formulation of the Minority Game,
in which the game is no longer discrete and binary. Since the response of the
strategy in TMG is defined as the inner product, i.e. a sum over all the P entries
of the vectors, all components of the strategy have to predict at each round. This
is a difference from the basic Minority Game where at each round, only one of
the P predictions on the strategy is effective. Despite these differences and the
continuous formulation, TMG reproduces the same collective behaviours as the
basic MG [35, 36].
6.3 The simple Minority Game without information
In this simplified Minority Game, no information are given to agents and thus
they have no strategy tables. Agents choose between the choice +1 and −1
according to the following probabilities,
Prob{ai(t) = ±1} ≡ e
±Ui(t)
eUi(t) + e−Ui(t)
(12)
and Ui(t) is updated by
Ui(t+ 1) = Ui(t)− Γ
N
A(t) (13)
where Ui(t) can be considered as the virtual score for agent i to make a decision
of “+1”, and −Ui(t) correspondingly the virtual score for agent i to make a
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decision of “-1”. If Ui(t) > 0, the past experience of the agents shows that it
is more successful to take action ai(t) = +1, and vice versa. The learning rate
or the temperature Γ is implemented in this model. This model gives a very
simple analytic explanation on the system’s dependence on Γ. For Γ < Γc, the
volatility is found to be proportional to N , i.e. σ2 ∝ N . For Γ > Γc, σ2 ∝ N2.
Γc is found to be dependent on the initial conditions Ui(0). In addition, σ
2
decreases with increasing Ui(0). Similar dependence of the volatility on Γ and
initial conditions, and the dependence of Γc on initial conditions are also found
in the basic Minority Game.
6.4 The Grand-canonical Minority Game
The grand-canonical Minority Game (abbreviated, GCMG) refers to a subclass
of Minority Games where the number of agents who actively participate in
the market is variable. Instead of summing over all N agents, the collective
action or the attendance A(t) is effectively the sum of the actions of active
agents at time t. Agents can be active or inactive at any time, depending on
their potential profitability from the market. The term “grand-canonical” origin
from the grand-canonical ensemble in statistical mechanics where the number
of particles in the observing system is variable. In most of the formulations
[23, 26, 28], when the highest virtual score of the strategies that an agent hold is
below some threshold or ǫt (where ǫ is usually a positive constant being referred
to as the interest rate and t is the number of rounds or time steps proceeded
from the beginning of the game), the agent refrain from participating in that
round of the game. It is equivalent to the addition of an inactive strategy for
every agent from which agents become inactive, and the virtual score of this
strategy is ǫt. Physically, it corresponds to circumstances of gaining an interest
of ǫ at each time step by keeping the capital in the form of cash, so agents
would only participate in the market if the gain from investments in the market
is greater than the interest rate. In some other formulations, instead of the
virtual score of the strategies, the real score of the agents is used to compare
with the interest rate [24]. Winning probabilities of strategies within a certain
time horizon are also considered [43, 24]. Individual capital concerns can also
be implemented to achieve the grand-canonical nature of the game [25, 28], in
which agents vary their investment size at each time step by considering risk,
gain potential or their limited capital.
These grand-canonical modifications from the Minority Game are considered
to be important and crucial in producing the stylized facts of financial markets
in the Minority Game models [24, 25, 26, 27, 28], while preserving the two-phase
structure of the predictable and unpredictable phase. The stylized facts being
reproduced in the models include the fat-tail volatility or price return distribu-
tions and volatility clustering, when the systems are close to the critical state.
Numerical tests and analytical attempts are carried out in the critical regime
of the models. These models serve as a tool for physicists in understanding
how macroscopic features are produced from the microscopic dynamics of in-
dividuals, which also support the conjecture of self-organized criticality of the
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financial market in which the financial market is always close to or attracted to
the critical state.
7 Analytic approaches on the Minority Game
There are several analytic approaches in solving the Minority Game. Most of
the approaches are based on the models of the basic Minority Game with little
modifications or simplifications. It is found that in the asymmetric phase with
α > αc, both equilibrium approaches and dynamics approaches are likely to
describe the same behaviours of the system, and the equilibrium approach based
on the minimization ofH give an analytic solution in this phase. [7, 8, 9, 10, 12].
For the symmetric phase with α < αc, fluctuations in the dynamics has to be
considered and the solution is dependent on initial conditions. The final state of
the system is sensitive to initial conditions and perturbations in the dynamics
[14, 10, 12]. In this case, solution is available in the limit of Γ→ 0 or asymptotic
behaviours can be obtained in the limit of α→ 0.
One of the early approach in solving the Minority Game is the crowd-
anticrowd theory which provide a qualitative explanation of the volatility de-
pendence on brain size M [4, 6, 5]. Consider the reduced strategy space (RSS)
with strategies R = 1 · · · 2M to be the uncorrelated strategies, R¯ to be the anti-
correlated strategy of R (i.e. R and R¯ always have opposite decisions), which
constituent the 2M+1 strategies in the RSS. We denote nR to be the number of
agent using the strategy R, nR¯ to be the number of agents using R¯ and 〈· · ·〉 to
be time averaging. For R and R′ to be uncorrelated strategies, the time average
〈∑R 6=R′(nR − nR¯)(nR′ − nR¯′)〉 = 0 and thus the volatility σ2 can be expressed
as
σ2 =
2M∑
R=1
(nR − nR¯)2 (14)
which physically corresponds to the contribution to the global volatility from
each crowd-anticrowd pair (R, R¯), as R and R¯ are always making opposite
decisions. If we consider a uniform distribution of all strategy combination
among agents at the beginning of the game, nR and nR¯ can be determined from
the ranking of virtual scores of strategies, since agents are always using the best
strategies they hold. In this case, the strategy with highest virtual point would
be the most popular strategy, while its anti-correlated partner would have lowest
virtual point and becomes the least popular strategy. This happen for small M
where the number of strategies is small and a large number of agents are using
the best strategy. On the contrary only a small number of agents are using its
anti-correlated strategy, leading to a large |nR − nR¯| and a large volatility. For
the cases of large M , even for the best strategy, nR is relatively small and the
nR¯ may have a similar magnitude as nR, leading to a small |nR − nR¯| and a
small volatility. This qualitatively explains the behaviours of volatility with α
based on the size of crowd-anticrowd pairs. The presence of temperature is also
considered in the extended crowd-anticrowd approach [6].
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In addition to this crowd-anticrowd theory, full analytic approach can be
developed. To solve the Minority Game analytically, we employ some convenient
notation change which make the tools in statistical physics more applicable
[7, 8, 9]. For the case of S = 2, we denote the first strategy of an agent to be
“+1” while the second one to be “-1” whereas the best strategy of agent i at
time t is now expressed as si(t) = ±1. The real bid ai(t) of agent i at time t
can then be expressed as
ai(t) = a
µ(t)
i,si(t)
= ω
µ(t)
i + si(t)ξ
µ(t)
i (15)
where ωµi = (a
µ
i,+ + a
µ
i,−)/2 and ξ
µ
i = (a
µ
i,+ − aµi,−)/2. ωµi and ξµi are quenched
disorders and are fixed at the beginning of the game. ωµi , ξ
µ
i = 0,±1 and
ωµi ξ
µ
i = 0 for all µ. si(t) is the dynamic variable and becomes explicit in the
action of agents, corresponding to the Ising spins in physical systems. Thus,
the attendance can be expressed as a function of spin si(t) given by
A(t) = Ωµ(t) +
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i si(t) (16)
where Ωµ =
∑
i ω
µ
i .
Other than the spin si(t), the virtual scores of the strategies are also dynamic
and we denote the difference of the virtual scores of the two strategies of agent
i to be Yi(t) given by
Yi(t) =
Γ
2
(Ui,+(t)− Ui,−(t)). (17)
This Yi(t) determines the relative probabilities of using the 2 strategies with
“inverse temperature” Γ and is updated by
Yi(t+ 1) = Yi(t)− Γ
N
ξ
µ(t)
i A(t) (18)
which is given by the update of the individual virtual scores Ui,+(t) and Ui,−(t)
in Eq. (6) with a factor of 1/N in the last term. Thus the probabilities Eq. (9)
for using the strategies si(t) = ±1 at time t becomes
Prob{si(t) = ±1} = πi,± = 1± tanhYi(t)
2
(19)
From this equation, we can calculate the time average of si(t) at equilibrium
with probabilities Eq. (19), denoted by mi, to be
mi = 〈si〉 = 〈tanh(Yi)〉 (20)
The system will be stationary with 〈Yi〉 ∼ vit, corresponding to a stationary
state solution of the set of mi. From Eq. (18), vi can be expressed as
vi = −Ωξi −
N∑
j=1
ξiξjmj (21)
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where · · · denotes the average over µ. For vi 6= 0, 〈Yi〉 diverges to ±∞ and
giving mi = ±1, corresponding to the frozen agents who always use the same
strategy. For vi = 0, 〈Yi〉 remains finite even after a long time and |mi| < 1,
corresponding to the fickle agents who always switch their active strategy even
in the stationary state of the game. We can identify Ωξi+
∑
j 6=i ξiξjmj to be an
external field while ξ2i to be the self-interaction of agent i. For an agent to be
frozen, the magnitude of external field has to be greater than the self-interaction.
In order to have fickle agents in the stationary state, the self-interaction term
is crucial.
We note that the above equation of vi in Eq. (21) and the corresponding
conditions of frozen and fickle agents are equivalent to the minimization of
predictability H , with H written in the form of
H =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
[
Ωµ +
N∑
i=1
ξµi mi
]2
(22)
Since mi’s are bounded in the range [−1,+1], H either attains its minimum at
dH/dmi = 0, giving Ωξi +
∑
j ξiξjmj = 0 (fickle agents) or at the boundary of
the range [−1,+1] of mi, giving mi = ±1 (frozen agents). Thus, we can identify
H as the Hamiltonian where the stationary state of the system is the ground
state which minimizes the Hamiltonian. From Eq. (16), the volatility of the
system can be expressed as
σ2 = H +
N∑
i=1
ξ2(1−m2i ) +
∑
i6=j
ξiξj〈(tanh Yi −mi)(tanhYj −mj)〉 (23)
The last term involves the fluctuations around the average behaviour of the
agents and is related to the dynamics of the system.
Identifying H as Hamiltonian reduces the problem into a conventional phys-
ical problem of finding the ground state of the system by minimizing the Hamil-
tonian. Solving the problem involves averaging the quantity lnZ over quenched
disorders corresponding to the strategies aµi,± (now represented by ω
µ
i and ξ
µ
i )
given to the agents at the beginning of the game. We note that the system is a
fully connected system in which agents interact with all other agents, and can be
handled by the replica approach as in spin glass models, under the assumption
of replica symmetry. Given the fraction of frozen agents to be φ, which can be
expressed as a function of α, αc = 0.3374 . . . [8] is found to be the solution of
the equation
α = 1− φ(α) (24)
In addition, this approach allows us to see that the system with different ini-
tial condition converges to the same unique solution, corresponding to a single
minima of H in the phase α > αc (replica symmetry). This method allows us
to get a complete solution for the Minority Game for all Γ in the phase α > αc.
Macroscopic quantities such as σ2 and H can be analytically calculated. For
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α < αc, there are multiple minimas of H = 0 and the system’s final state is
not unique (replica symmetry breaking) and depends on its initial state. In
this case, dynamics has to be considered. Breaking of replica symmetry is also
considered in the case with market impact [17].
We notice that the in the long run, the characteristic time in the dynamics
are approximately proportional to N , where all agents observe the performance
of their strategies among all P states with P = αN . This characteristic time
is also inversely proportional to Γ since the dynamics of scores take a time of
approximately 1/Γ to adapt a change of scores, as discussed before. The real
time t can then be rescaled as
τ =
Γ
N
t (25)
in which one characteristic time step τ in the system corresponds to N/Γ real
time steps t. This is the reason for the systems with small Γ having a convergence
time of N/Γ. We can hence write down a dynamical equation for Yi in the
rescaled time by denoting the variable yi(τ) = Yi(Nτ/Γ) which gives
dyi
dτ
= −Ωξi −
N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yi) + ζi (26)
where the first two terms on the right hand side represents the average behavior
of agents obtained by the average frequency they play their strategies [10]. These
two terms are considered to be deterministic. The last term ζi represents the
noise or the fluctuations around the average behaviour. The properties of these
fluctuation is given by
〈ζ(τ)〉 = 0 (27)
〈ζ(τ)ζ(τ ′)〉 ∼= Γσ
2
N
ξiξjδ(τ − τ ′) (28)
By writing down the Fokker-Planck equation for the probability distribution
P ({yi}, t) [10], much physical implications can be obtained. We first note that
the noise covariance Eq. (28) is linearly related to Γ, revealing the role of Γ
as the global temperature of the system. When Γ → 0, the noise covariance
vanishes and the minimization of H gives a valid solution, even for α < αc.
It can also be deduced that in the asymmetric phase, the last term in Eq.
(23) vanishes such that σ2 is independent of Γ and initial conditions. In the
symmetric phase, this last term does not vanishes and σ2 is dependent on both
Γ and initial conditions.
An alternative approach to derive dynamical equations is the generating
functional approach [14, 15, 16], which monitors the dynamics using path inte-
grals over time. The approach was first used on the batch update version of the
Minority Game, in which agents update their virtual scores only after a batch
of P time steps and with Γ→∞ as in the basic Minority Game. The quenched
disorder can be averaged out in the dynamical equations and in the limit of
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N →∞, we obtain a representative “single” agent dynamical equation with the
variable y(t), where y(t) represents the difference in the virtual scores of the two
strategies of this “single” agent after the t-th batch. The dynamics is stochastic
but non-Markovian in nature, and can be extended to region inaccessible by the
replica method. This method again confirm the relation of Eq. (24) and giving
the same value of αc [14] For α > αc, the fraction of frozen agents φ is obtained
analytically and the volatility is calculated to a high accuracy. For α < αc in
the limit of α → 0, σ is shown to diverge as σ ∼ α−1/2 for y(0) < yc, and
vanishes as σ ∼ α1/2 for y(0) > yc, with yc ≈ 0.242 [14]. This approach was
later extended to the case of on-line update (update of virtual score after every
step) and the cases of Γ <∞ [16, 15]
8 Minority Games and Financial Markets
The basic Minority Game model is a simple model which is used to describe the
possible interaction of investors in the financial markets. Despite its simplic-
ity, some variants of the game show certain predictive abilities on real financial
data [24, 43, 22]. Though Minority Games are simple, they setup a framework
of agent-based models from which sophisticated trading models can be built,
and implementation on real trading may be possible. Although these sophis-
ticated models are usually used for private trading and may not be open to
public, Minority Games are still a useful tool to understand the dynamics in
financial markets. There are several fundamental difference between the basic
game and the markets. The basic Minority Game is a negative sum game in
which the sum of gain of all agents is negative. Agents do not concern about
capital and cannot refrain from participation even if they found the game un-
profitable. Whether the simple payoff function in Eq. (6) correctly represents
the evaluation of strategies by real investor is questionable. We also note that
the symmetric phase corresponds to a phase of information efficiency in which
the game becomes unpredictable.
Although the basic Minority Game gives a very colourful collective be-
haviours of agents from a simple interaction and dynamics, some details can
affect the behaviours and modifications have to be made in order to draw a
more direct correspondence of Minority Games to real financial markets. Some
variants of the Minority Game are modified to study a particular issue or aspect
of the real markets. While with the introduction of several financial aspects,
some variants of the game lead to a more realistic model of the market and at
the same time complicating the models. Among different aspects, one of the
primary issue is to draw analogy to trading where price dynamics has to be
introduced in the Minority Game. A common price dynamics used in the game
is to relate the attendance A(t) to the price p(t), and thus the return r(t) in
trading is given by
r(t) ≡ log[p(t+ 1)]− log[p(t)] = A(t)
λ
(29)
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where λ is called the liquidity which is used to control the sensitivity of price on
attendance. With this or similar price dynamics, trading process can be defined
in the game.
After the introduction of price dynamics, the issue of payoff function was
also addressed. The mixed minority-majority game originally proposed by M.
Marsili [18] is based on a a simplified version of the Minority Game in which
there is no strategy table and no information (as discussed in Section 6). The
payoff function is this model is based on the expectations of the agents on the
price change in the next steps. For simplicity, we consider the expectation
Ei[A(t + 1)|t] of agent i on the attendance A(t + 1) in the next step, which is
expressed as
Ei[A(t+ 1)|t] = −ΦiA(t) (30)
For Φi > 0, agents expect the attendance in the next step to be negatively
correlated with that in the present step (i.e. price fluctuates), revealing the
minority nature of agents and they are called fundamentalists or contrarian
agents. For Φi < 0, agents expects the attendance in the next step to be
positively correlated with that in the present step (i.e. price trend develops),
revealing to the majority nature of the agents and they are called trend followers.
For both fundamentalists and trend followers, if they expect the price to go up
the next step, buying is considered to be profitable, and vice versa. Thus, the
payoff function δUi(t) = Ui(t+ 1)− Ui(t) is proportional to the product of the
current decision ai(t) and the expectation of price change in the next step given
by
δUi(t) ∝ ai(t)Ei[A(t+ 1)|t] = −Φiai(t)A(t) (31)
with Φi > 0 and Φi < 0 corresponding to fundamentalists and trend followers
respectively. Hence, fundamentalists are considered to be playing a minority
game while trend followers playing a majority game.
The two kinds of agents interact in the same game and it was found that
the ratio of fundamentalists to trend followers is important in affecting the
behaviours of the system. If more than half of the agents are fundamen-
talists, the fundamentalists prevail and the game is minority in nature with
〈A(t + 1)A(t)〉 < 0. On the other hand, if more than half of the agents are
trend followers, the trend followers prevail and the game is majority in nature
with 〈A(t + 1)A(t)〉 > 0. Thus, the behaviours of both minority and majority
agents are found to be self-sustained, depending on the relative population of
the agents.
The $-game [19] shares some similarity of the majority nature of the trend
followers in the mixed minority-majority game, but with a crucial difference of
using the real attendance of the next step, not the expectations of agents, in
the payoff function. In $-game, agents are again equipped with strategy tables
and the virtual score of strategy s is updated according to
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t) + a
µ
i,s(t− 1)A(t). (32)
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δUi,s(t)
Minority Game −aµi,s(t)A(t)
Majority Game aµi,s(t)A(t)
$-game aµi,s(t− 1)A(t)
Table 2: The payoff functions of the Minority Game, the majority game and
the $-game, with Φi set to ±1 in the mixed minority-majority game.
According to this payoff scheme, the present actions aµi,s(t) would only change
the payoff at the next step at t + 1. Suppose an agent buys an asset, he gains
by selling the asset the next step if the price rises, and vice versa. This pay-
off scheme aims to model the mode of one-step speculating in realistic markets
though agents are not restricted to act oppositely in consecutive steps in the
model. Bubble-like behaviours are found in the model, in which agents buy
(sell) and push up (down) the price, leading to positive evaluations of the buy-
ing actions such that agents are more likely to buy (sell) again. This process
continues and a persistent price trend is observed. This persistent price trend
is not observed in real markets, and can be eliminated from the model if agents
concern their limited capital, risk or maximum holding of assets [19, 28, 21, 22].
To summarize the different payoff schemes in the Minority game, majority game
and the $-game, Table 2 shows the payoff functions of the three games.
Other than the payoff functions, we consider the stationary state of collective
behaviours in the system. The stationary state of the Minority Game is not a
Nash Equilibrium. There are extremely large number of Nash Equilibrium in
the Minority Game [18, 17] and one example is (N + 1)/2 agents always make
an action of ai(t) = +1 while (N − 1)/2 agents always make an action of
ai(t) = −1. In this case, σ = 1 and no individual has incentives to change his
action by himself alone (the majority group change if any of the losers moves).
This state is not stationary in the game. The stationary state of the game is
described by the minimization of predictability H , but Nash Equilibriums are
states of minimum volatility σ2. Physically, instead of competing with the other
N−1 players, agents are interacting with the total attendance A(t) which include
also its own action. By subtracting their own actions from the attendance, their
cumulated payoffs Eq. (13) in the simplified minority game becomes
Ui(t+ 1) = Ui(t)− Γ
N
[A(t)− ηai(t)] (33)
where η denotes the market impact. The Minority Game corresponds to the case
of η = 0 in which Nash Equilibrium is not attained. In this simplified model,
η > 0 brings heterogeneity to behaviours of agents and Nash Equilibrium is
attained [18].
In some variants of the Minority Game, the role of participants are studied.
It was suggested that symbiotic relation is present between two kinds of traders
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[41, 7, 25], namely the producers and the speculators. Producers are agents
who always participate and trade with only one strategy. They have a primary
interest in trading in the market for business or other reasons. Speculators are
agents who speculate and have no interest in the intrinsic values of the assets
traded. They can refrain from participating in the market at any time they
found it unprofitable. This model correspond to one of the grand-canonical
Minority Games. In this model, it was found that the gain of producers are
always negative but their loses decrease with increasing number of speculators,
since speculators provide liquidity to producers and make the market more
unpredictable. On the other hand, the gain of speculators generally increases
with the number of producers, since producers provide more information to
speculators which make the market more predictable. As a result, producers
and speculators are symbiotic.
In addition to studying the role of producers and speculators, the grand-
canonical Minority Game (GCMG) plays a crucial role in understanding finan-
cial markets [26, 24, 28]. By introducing the grand-canonical nature to the
model, agents can choose to refrain from participating in the market when they
found the game unprofitable. While observing the market as non-trading out-
siders, they can participate in the market again once they found it profitable.
The predictable and unpredictable phases are usually preserved in this class of
models, where fat-tail distributions of price return are found around the phase
transition point. These can be fitted by a power laws. While outside the critical
region, the fluctuation distributions becomes gaussian. In addition, volatility
clustering, where high volatility are likely to cluster in time, is also found and
can be fitted by power laws or other forms of function [25, 28, 26, 34]. It suggests
that the dynamics of agents is correlated in time.
The observation of power laws in the model coincides with the observations
of fat-tail price return distributions and volatility clustering in real markets in
the high frequency range [44]. While gaussian fluctuations are not found in real
markets, these properties of the model provides an important implications or
conjectures of financial markets being in the critical state. It also suggests the
possibility of self-organized critical system as an explanation of the behaviours
of financial markets. In addition to power laws, rescaling of financial market
data of different frequencies [45] also provides preliminary evidence of the prop-
erty of scale invariance in time in critical systems. Although power laws in
financial markets may have origins other than critical phenomenon [46], these
conjectures provide a potential perspective in understanding the dynamics and
behaviours or the markets. If financial markets exist as a critical phenomenon,
their behaviours can be understood qualitatively from the underlying nature
of interactions in similar systems within the same universality class. In this
case, microscopic details of the systems are not crucial in affecting the generic
behaviours for systems in the same class. As financial markets are observed
to be operated close to informationally efficiency, correspondingly, the grand-
canonical Minority Games show stylized facts near the critical point of phase
transition to the unpredictable phase, i.e. the phase of informationally efficiency.
In some versions of the grand-canonical minority game, rarely large fluctuations
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resulting from a sudden participation of a larger number of speculators are also
found which draw analogy to market crashes.
9 Future Directions
In view of the exciting physical pictures bring along with the grand-canonical
minority games, more analytic works can be developed in understanding the
dynamics of the critical regime around which the fat-tail distributions and the
volatility clustering are found. Formation of power laws and anomalous fluc-
tuations may be understood with the analytic tools. Analytic approach on
the grand-canonical minority game also provides more clues in proving or dis-
proving the conjecture of the financial market being a self-organized critical
phenomenon.
On the other hand, simple modeling works which reveal more the dynamics
of the financial market are still possible. Development of other simple models
which draw direct analogy to the financial markets, together with analytic solu-
tion is crucial in understanding how the markets work. Other than the grand-
canonical games, some variants of the basic Minority Game are still simple and
worth solving analytically. Although analytic solution may not be available for
complicated models which introduce more and more realistic aspects into the
game, comprehensive modeling based on the inductive nature of agent-based
models provides us a new perspective in understanding the financial markets.
Other than modeling, efforts may be put in implementing the Minority-
Game kind of strategies in real trading. Although the strategies from the basic
Minority Game and its variants may not accurately describe the strategies for
real trading, the simplicity of the strategy does leave us a large freedom in ex-
panding, modifying and tuning with respect to profitability attaining in real
trading. Using Minority Games as framework, sophisticated real trading sys-
tem can be built which include a comprehensive picture of trading mechanism.
Predictive capacity may also be obtained from this kinds of agent-based model
which goes beyond the standard economic assumption of deductive agents and
market efficiency. All these directions show a great potential over the conven-
tional statistical tools in financial analysis. These developments may be used
for private trading and may not be accessible through public and academic lit-
eratures. Some of the works [24, 22, 43] have already shown potentials in this
direction of application.
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